Forms of experience and the role of perception

Following Brandt (1995), we can attempt an initial typology of the forms of ex­perience with a division into three main domains: the perceptual field, relating to the physical world; the social field, relating to the cultural and intersubjective world; and the psychic-emotive field, relating to the world of internal experiences. However, this schematization is only acceptable if we consider the three domains as virtual poles and clearly separable from each other; experience is rarely if ever of a single kind and it is difficult to imagine a pure perception that is not at the same time cultural, or a psychological phenomenon detached from intersubjectiv-ity (just consider the eminently cultural and social nature of emotions such as envy, jealousy, disdain, and the like). It is, however, plausible that some experi­ences fall more directly within one domain than another, and this typology can be productive when applied to the surface linguisric manifestation. When we have the task of describing the variance between the semantics of tiger and shame, we cannot avoid the crucial issue of the dissimilar experiences determining the con­struction of these entities and their categorizarion; tiger is perceptually deter­mined, while shame is an experiential nucleus anchored to an internal state, which may be subject to cultural determination but has no perceptual correlate.

I would like for a moment to concentrate on the role of perception, a problem that I have already looked at in chapter 1. Perception is undoubtedly one of the most significant possible parameters of variation in the structuring of the semantic system, as was already implicitly recognized in certain categories of traditional analysis such as the opposition between concrete and abstract. We can imagine that the role of perceptual experience in semantic classification lies along a con­tinuum; at one extreme are terms for whose semantics the perceptual dimension is an essential component, and at the other extreme terms which relate to abstract schemata. We have already seen numerous examples of the former: color terms, natural kinds, what I have called "natural anions" (predicates like run, jum/i, etc.), adjectives indicating tastes, smells, tactile .sensations, etc. These cannot be

described without reference to the particular perceptual experience that motivates them. Consequently, the semantic treatment of these terms cannot be based ex­clusively on linguistic and propositional descriptions, but must resort to other semiotic systems of representation that permit perceptual information to be codi­fied, for example, iconic-spatial systems.

All vocabulary that refers to a phenomenology of perceptual-corporeal expe­rience has analogous characteristics, in so far as it possesses an indexical dimension that relates to non-linguistic experiences. There are, however, some interesting dif­ferences. We have perceptual experiences not only of natural objects existing in­dependently of us, but also of concrete entities that we have constructed and which could be placed, in our ideal tripartite division of the forms of experience, between the natural world and the social and cultural one. Think of man-made artifacts, a lexical category we have already in part analyzed and which has a different internal semantic structure to natural kinds. The difference lies in the fact that while natural kinds reflect saliencies that are exclusively perceptual, terms for artifacts (and also other parts of speech, such as verbs like drive, bike, etc.) refer to saliencies that are both perceptual and functional. The latter are closely con­nected to social and cultural experiences. In section 10.4 we will see how the dis­tinction between perceptual and functional components is, interestingly, also sup­ported at a psycholinguistic and even neurolinguistic level; for the moment I would like to stress the connection between semantic configuration and form of experience. The semantics of the various lexical classes varies according to the different nature of the experience underlying the linguistic structure.

We can also revisit from this perspective the question of the prototypical structure of various lexical classes and the different configurations of essential properties and typical properties. We have already seen that with natural kinds, typical properties referring to form, dimension, and appearance can be erased and do not constitute criteria for identification: a cat that does not meow, has no tail, has no ears, and so on is still a cat. Its constitutive property seems to be defined in a circular way by its specific difference (what makes a cat a cat is its cat being), or, following Kripke, by its being an indexical pointer toward that particular spe­cies. It is often difficult to linguistically define the constitutive properties of natu­ral kinds, not only because of the role of perceptual information in constituting the corresponding concept, but because in these cases the properties of the object possess a life history independent of our nomination. The non-fuzzy boundaries of the lexical semantic category directly reflect the non-fuzzy boundaries that di­vide animal species from each other, and as this is independent of our linguistic codification, it is not surprising that in many cases we are unable to find a linguis­tic definition capable of representing this aspect. The criteria of species identifica­tion are not based on, and are not obtainable through, descriptions, which means that encyclopedic knowledge and individual criteria should in this case be kept distinct (this is equivalent to saying that semantic competence and referential competence may not always coincide, as I have already argued). We will see that this hypothesis is supported by empirical data.

The case of man-made artifacts is different. We know that the lexical cate­gories for these terms have boundaries so fuzzy that in some cases they may extend almost indefinitely, as we have already seen in many examples. The semantic configuration of the lexical category depends on the mixed character of the expe­rience to which the artifacts refer, which is not only perceptual but also highly cultural. An artifact is produced by a culture to satisfy a particular function that may be realized through infinite variations and may not correspond to a single lexical category. We can build an unlimited number of different objects for writ­ing, sitting, dressing, drinking, and so forth, all diverse in terms of form, dimen­sion, materials, etc. The functional properties that are essential for the semantics of artifact terms are therefore general, not specific to individual lexical classes, and they do not delimit classes in a univocal way. Though the essential property of chair is the function "object for sitting on," this function is equally essential for a wide range of other classes (armchairs, sofas, stools, etc.).

If we try to define more precisely what makes a chair a chair, and not another object for sitting on, we are fatally obliged to turn to typical properties. However, as these are all either individually or collectively erasable, there remain no strong criteria for categorial identification and delimitation. This is why these terms al­low the phenomenon of semantic recontextualization, whereby the meaning of chair can be extended to take in and indicate a pile of books. The flexibility of properties, at its maximum with artifacts, permits these terms to be used even in apparently anomalous contexts; this flexibility forces the activation of an adequate context of interpretation, which appears much more problematic for terms refer­ring to exclusively perceptual experiences.¹ Moreover, the typical properties of artifacts, though like natural kinds they refer to an essentially perceptual dimen­sion in terms of the form of the objects, fall into the field of culturally and socially constructed experience: objects for sitting on, for example, are typical in a strongly relativistic sense, in the context of a particular culture. In this sector of experience, for instance, traditional Japanese culture certainly does not have the same habits and typical artifacts as Western culture. This also means that typical features are in these cases more subject to modification; given their culturally relative nature, it is always possible to negotiate a redefinition. If cases of contextual resemantici-zation display this possibility of extension on the synchronic plane, transforma­tions in time mark their diachronic dynamism. We continue to use words like air­plane and iron for objects that have little in common, except their functions, with those denoted by the same terms just fifty yeats ago. Shape, materials, dimensions, perceptual features—everything that goes to make up typical appearance—have changed, but only rarely do these modifications represent a problem for linguistic use; the same term adapts without difficulty to a new perceptual configuration. We could say that the more culturally defined typical features are, the more they are modifiable and subject to redefinition.

At the opposite extreme from terms motivated by perceptual experience wc find so-called abstract terms, a rather vague denomination that undoubtedly re quires closer analysis. In the first place, it covers heterogeneous categories dial

need to be broken down into different typologies; secondly, not all so-called ab­stract terms are abstract in the same way. For example, in the field of cognitively oriented research, it is a widely held view that the semantic schemata underlying many predicates not directly connected to perceptual-spatial experiences are in reality based on spatial structures.² Without going into this complex issue, I will limit myself here to a few observations concerning the problem of typical seman­tic configuration and categorial identification.

It is well known that with abstract terms, distinguishing the boundaries of a semantic category and consequently fixing the limits of application of terms seem to be constitutively impossible. Think, for example, of the meaning of terms like honor, respect, good, and love. The boundaries of the corresponding conceptual categories are extremely fuzzy, and it even seems difficult to identify a stable set of typical properties, not only across different cultures, but also between different individuals of the same culture. The prototype is in these cases highly idiosyn­cratic and closely linked to individual experiences of the structuring of the given concept. It is hard to come up with an intersubjective and universally shared definition, and often definitions of such terms are reduced to a small number of generic features. Furthermore, even when a minimum and provisional agree­ment on criteria is established, the process of identification can always prove con­troversial.

In these cases, we can speak neither of a single prototype, understood as a relatively stable nucleus of properties that are recognized as typical, nor of inter-subjectively established criteria of identification. The criteria for establishing the appropriateness of an expression like a good book are problematic firstly because they involve utterly heterogeneous parameters. A book can be judged to be good because it is fun, useful, informative, well-written, well-bound, and so on. But even if it were possible to reach provisional agreement on the parameters, their identification would always be unavoidably tied to individual judgement. In these cases, the work involved in the intersubjective negotiation of meaning is at a maxi­mum and often each use of an abstract term requires a complex strategy of recip­rocal adjustment and renegotiation.

The differences among the admittedly limited number of abstract lexical categories just examined clearly show the impossibility of a unitary model of rep­resentation in the face of the emergence of experiential saliencies that vary greatly in nature and kind. Also connected to these differences are the diverse origins of the fuzzy effects and the forms that they can assume. In fact, it is difficult to establish a criterion that can univocally define what makes the boundaries of cer­tain categories fuzzy. Above all, where do the blurred effects of some notions have their origins? Artifacts, for example, possess fuzzy boundaries, but certainly nei­ther the objects in the category nor our perceptions of them are indefinite; there are no points of perceptual indefiniteness, as occurs when an object is itself struc­turally indefinite (think of fog or steam) or when the perceptual experience itself is inherently fuzzy, as with the perception of light.

Without doubt, however, the most representative examples of fuzzy bound­aries, and possibly the most common in the lexicon, are those in which the con­cept is constitutively indefinite. In the case of abstract terms, the conceptual coun­terparts are often indefinite both at the level of referential identification, in that they can refer to manifold entities, and at the level of definition, which is not easily reducible either to a series of properties or to a univocal typical model. This true of all terms referring to individual subjective experiences, such as emotions, states of mind, and psychic attitudes. How can we know, when talking about pain, happiness, anguish, or love, that we are all understanding the same thing? And to what extent is our language a private language?

Almeida (1992) proposed a classification of the various fuzzy concepts, which he called "enigmatic notions." According to Almeida, there are three different types of "enigma": of representation, identification, and reference. The first kind of enigma are cases where, despite the availability of sufficient pragmatic elements for identification, there is a lack of elements permitting effective definition. An example of this type would be the term water. With enigmas of identification the problem is the reverse: representation is possible, but there are no practical criteria for recognition. An example of this would be the notion a good student which, though univocal, might lead to contradictory identifications. Finally, enigmas of reference relate to notional objects whose boundaries are objectively blurred, such as private experiences, the concept of God, and deictic expressions like wait for me here.

Although the attempt to produce a typology of blurred notions is interesting, the classificatory criteria proposed by Almeida do not appear entirely convincing. It might be more useful to distinguish between fuzzy notions and approximate uses. There are notions that are inherently blurred, such as private experiences, and notions whose boundaries are not necessarily blurred although their use often is. For example, water does not really pose an enigma of representation, given that an adequate description of it is by no means impossible; rather its use is approxi mate in relation to the representation, because we can use the term water indis­criminately for distilled water, seawater, rainwater, mineral water, etc.